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a) Executive Summary
This study examines the component sourcing strategy of the Japanese automobile
manufacturers, focusing on the sourcing concentration and the sharing common suppliers
with competitors.  We have analyzed sourcing strategy of six Japanese car assemblers
(Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi, Mazda, and Suzuki) regarding 95 components.  We
have found that firms using a broad manufacturer-supplier network tend to be more
profitable.  In other words, firms with a low sourcing concentration and a high supplier
sharing, which are the characteristics of quasi-market strategy, tend to perform better than
the other firms.  Among the six manufacturers, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki were
categolized as firms that followed quasi-market strategy.
We believe that this finding is interesting because this relationship has been found
in the context of the Japanese supplier-assembler relationship.  The Japanese cooperative
inter-firm relationship is supposed to be beneficial to suppliers, as well as to assemblers.  It
is commonly considered that a relatively exclusive keiretsu system facilitates these close
inter-firm ties.  However, the results in this study imply that a few leading Japanese
automobile manufacturers may have management capabilities in benefiting from both a
relatively broad supplier base and cooperative relationship with individual suppliers.
b) Research Results
(1) Research Questions
Many studies have compared supplier management practices between the U.S. and
Japanese automobile industries, emphasizing the advantages of the Japanese style of
management  (Clark and Fujimoto, 1990; Cusumano and Takeishi, 1994; Nishiguchi,
1994; Helper and Sako, 1994).  The literature has explained that, in the Japanese
automobile industry, a manufacturer and a supplier coordinate to perform interdependent
tasks effectively by sharing more information, investing in relation-specific assets, and
relying on trust to manage the relationship.  These studies and others have also implied that
this type of supplier relationship is supported by the Japanese keiretsu system (Lincoln, et.
al., 1992; Dyer and Ouchi, 1993).
Many studies seem to have implied that Japanese automobile firms or at least the
leading ones have a keiretsu supplier group and maintain a relatively exclusive relationship
within the group.  However, there is actually a complicated manufacturer-supplier network
across these groups.  Many suppliers sell a certain type of components to multiple
competing automobile manufacturers, while auto manufacturers buy most components
from multiple suppliers. This study analyzes details of the network structure to determine
the different sourcing strategies each Japanese assembler follows.
(2) Framework of Sourcing Strategy
In order to conceptualize sourcing strategy, this section develops a framework
using two strategic dimensions in component sourcing.  The first dimension, the sourcing
concentration, determines the degree of reliance on a small number of suppliers such as on
a single supplier.  This dimension is similar in concept to the number of suppliers from
which a firm procure a certain type of components, which some existing studies have
treated as one of the important dimensions of sourcing strategy (Helper, 1991; Cusumano
and Takeishi, 1991; Nishiguchi, 1994).  The second dimension in this framework
determines the degree of supplier sharing with competing assemblers.  Some assemblers
may buy a certain type of component from a supplier that exclusively sells it to the
manufacturer, while others may rely on a supplier that sells the same type of component to
other manufacturers as well.
These two dimensions lead to a framework that contains four different sourcing
strategies as shown in Figure 1.  In order to illustrate the framework, it also shows a
simple hypothetical example of a network that consists of six manufacturers and seven
suppliers.  In this model, six manufacturers buy a certain type of component in the
component market where seven suppliers compete.  M1 is an example of a manufacturer
that has a high sourcing concentration and a low supplier sharing.  It buys this component
from a single supplier that does not deal with any of the other automobile assemblers at
least on this particular type of component.  On the other hand, M2 buys the component
from three suppliers.  Therefore, its sourcing concentration is lower than M1.  M2 does not
share these suppliers with other competitors either, and the degree of supplier sharing is as
low as M1.  M3, M4, and M5 have a low concentration ratio and high supplier sharing.
M6 concentrates only on one supplier, but the supplier sells the component to other
manufacturers, which positions this assembler as the one following a high concentration
ratio and high supplier sharing.
























By using these dimensions, this framework features a distinction between the
quasi-hierarchy and the quasi-market sourcing strategies.  The strategy followed by M1
forms a sourcing structure featuring one-to-one manufacturer-supplier relationship with
respect to a certain type of component, which is similar to the notion of a hierarchical
relationship. The opposite extreme of this dimension is called “quasi-market” (Itami, 1988;
Asanuma, 1989).  Quasi-market nature of the sourcing structure increases when
manufacturers lower sourcing concentration and increase supplier sharing, such as M3,
M4, and M5.
The following discussions consider potential influences of different sourcing
strategies.  With respect to the first dimension, the sourcing concentration, it is rather clear
from the existing literature that too much concentration on a small number of suppliers such
as M1 and M6 may be inappropriate for buyers (Itami, 1988; Asanuma, 1989; McMillan,
1990; Cusumano and Takeishi, 1991).  It may prevent the suppliers from competing with
each other in supplying high quality components at a low price, and provides suppliers
with some monopolistic power.
Too much dispersion to a large number of suppliers may also have some negative
impacts.  It may deter a manufacturer from closely monitoring individual suppliers.  In
other words, the number of suppliers may have a curvilinear relationship with the
effectiveness of manufacturer’s management of suppliers.  However, Japanese auto
manufacturers do not usually have a problem of too many suppliers, because they seldom
buy a type of component from more than five suppliers (Itami, 1988; Cusumano and
Takeishi, 1991).  Therefore, this framework hypothesizes only the first part of the
relationship: too much concentration may have a negative influence on the supplier
management efficiency.
With respect to the second dimension, supplier sharing, there may be several
advantages to buy a component from suppliers that sell the same type of component to
multiple automobile manufacturers.  First, suppliers could enjoy the economies of scale by
selling the same type of components to multiple customers, which may, in turn, benefit
each customer.  The more assemblers buy the same components from the same supplier,
the more the price of components decreases.
Second, multiple manufacturers that procure a component from the same supplier
may benefit from quality assurance. Suppliers may obtain more information and data
regarding technological drawbacks and customer needs when they apply a basic component
design to components at many different manufacturers.  Therefore, manufacturers that
procure a component from multi-user suppliers may have a better opportunity to buy high-
quality components.
Lastly, when there is an extensive “manufacturer - supplier - manufacturer” linkage,
there may be a positive influence on inter-firm learning through the network.  Suppliers
may learn specific capabilities from transactions with various manufacturers. Therefore,
manufacturers that buy components from multi-user suppliers may procure components at a
lower cost.  Moreover, automobile manufacturers that share the same suppliers may learn
technical or management knowhow from each other through the learning network in which
a supplier is positioned at the center.
(3) Sample and Data
This study uses a publicly available database (Sogogiken Corp., 1995), which
contains a manufacturer/supplier transaction matrix for 235 components.  The database
include transactions only for production in Japan.  Table 1 shows an example of the matrix
on the fuel filter from the database.  The data are only in units not in values. Among 235
components covered in the database, this study uses data on 95 components that satisfy the
following two conditions.  First, this study focuses only on car manufacturers and
excludes components used exclusively for trucks. Second, components that at least one
manufacturer internally sources are excluded.
Table 1:  An Example of Data from the Database
Component:  Fuel Filter (in thousand units per year)
Supplier Toyota Nissan Honda Mazda Mitsubishi Suzuki





Toyoroki Seizo 898 584
Tokyoroki 100 215 184
Total 2822 1350 998 860 919 778
This study measures the first variable, the sourcing concentration, primarily by
applying the idea of the Herfindahl index, which is equal to the sum of the squares of the
sourcing share from each supplier on a certain type of component. In order to obtain the
sourcing concentration at the manufacturer level, there are three steps of calculation.  First,
a Herfindahl index for each of the 95 components at each manufacturer was obtained.
Second, in order to adjust for the biased influence of different types of component, the
Herfindahl indices of the six firms were standardized at the component level.  In this way,
differences in the sourcing strategy among manufacturers at the component level can be
precisely aggregated.  Then, an average of the 95 standardized Herfindahl indices at each
firm was obtained.  We also calculated the one-supplier ratio, which measures the ratio of
components that each firm buys from a single supplier.  For example, if a firm procures 10
components from only one supplier, the one-supplier ratio would be 10.5% (=10/95).
Procuring a certain type of component from one supplier may, in particular, have a negative
influence on the firm.
In order to obtain data on the second variable, the supplier sharing index, we first
counted the number of car manufacturers to which each component supplier for a certain
component sells.  If a manufacturer buys the component from multiple suppliers, we
averaged the numbers of manufacturers to which each supplier sells.  For example, in
Table 1, Toyota buys fuel filters from Nippon Denso and Kyosan Denki.  Nippon Denso
sells the component to four manufacturers, and Kyosan Denki only one (= Toyota).  The
supplier sharing index for this component at Toyota equals 2.5, an average of the two.
Then, sharing indices for six manufacturers with respect to a certain component were
standardized in order to adjust for different types of components.  Lastly, we averaged the
95 standardized sharing indices for each firm to obtain a sharing index for each firm.  We
also measured the one-customer ratio, which is the percentage of components for which a
manufacturer does not share any suppliers with its competitors.
For the performance measurement of the automobile manufacturers, this study uses
the annual operating profit divided by sales in multiple periods ending in March 1994 and
March 1995 (Kaisha Shikiho, Fall 1995).
(4) Results
Table 2 summarizes results from the data analyses.  This table shows that there are
two distinct groups of manufacturers with respect to the sourcing strategy, those that
follow the quasi-market strategy and those that follow the quasi-hierarchy strategy.  One
group consists of Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki, which all shows both a low sourcing
concentration and a high supplier sharing.  On the other hand, the second group including
Nissan and Honda shows the characteristics of the quasi-hierarchy strategy including both
a high sourcing concentration and a low supplier sharing.  Mazda seems to be positioned
between the two.
Table 2:  Summary Table
Toyota Nissan Honda Mazda Mitsub Suzuki Av.
Sourcing Concentration LOW HIGH HIGH LOW LOW
     Herfindahl Index (Std.) -0.09 0.13 0.14 0.03 -0.09 -0.12 0
     Herfindahl Index (Raw) 0.68 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.70
     One-Supplier Ratio 25.26 31.58 28.42 17.89 17.89 24.21 24.21
Supplier Sharing HIGH LOW LOW HIGH HIGH
     Sharing Index (Std.)*** 0.14 -0.44 -0.16 0.03 0.05 0.39 0
     Sharing Index (Raw)*** 3.45 2.87 3.08 3.35 3.36 3.62 3.29
     One-Customer Ratio (%)*** 7.81 28.12 29.69 15.62 9.38 9.38 16.67
Avg. Number of Suppliers*** 2.22 2.12 2.01 2.38 2.45 2.12 2.22
(Minimum/Maximum) (1/6) (1/5) (1/5) (1/5) (1/6) (1/4)
Operating Profit/Sales (3/94) 0.94% -1.02% 0.75% -2.50% 1.63% 2.17% 0.33%
Operating Profit/Sales (3/95) 2.52% -2.20% 1.29% -2.10% 2.55% 2.94% 0.83%
*** Difference significant at the 0.001 level (ANOVA)
First, with respect to the sourcing concentration, the Herfindahl Indices (Std.) of
Nissan and Honda are 0.13 and 0.14, respectively, which are higher than those of Toyota,
Mitsubishi, and Suzuki.  Even though the ANOVA test did not show that the inter-firm
differences were statistically significant, t-tests revealed some significant differences.  For
example, the difference between Nissan and Suzuki is significant at the 5% level, and the
one between Nissan and Toyota at the 10% level.  The differences in the supplier sharing
indices among the six firms are large and statistically significant.  There are also two
distinct groups with respect to this dimension.  The standardized sharing indices of Toyota
and Suzuki at 0.14 and 0.39 are much higher than those of Nissan and Honda, which are
-0.44 and -0.16, respectively.  That of Mitsubishi is in between at 0.05.  However,
because the one-customer ratio of Mitsubishi is similar to those of Toyota and Suzuki, we
may be able to categorize Mitsubishi into the group with a high supplier sharing index.
In Table 2, manufacturers that follow the quasi-market strategy are the three best
performers with respect to the profit/sales dimension in both years. Table 3 shows results
from the rank-order Spearman correlation among the sourcing concentration, the supplier
sharing, and operating profit/sales.  There are statistically significant relationships among
these variables.  Firms with a low sourcing concentration and a high supplier sharing,
which are the characteristics of quasi-market strategy, tend to perform better than the other
firms.
Table 3:  Results for Rank-Order Spearman Correlation Analyses (n=6)
Significant at:







Operating Profit/Sales 1.00 - -
Herfindahl Index (Std.) -0.77*/-0.83** 1.00 -
Suppl. Sharing Index (Std.) 0.77*/0.89** -0.89** 1.00
Table 2 contains several other interesting data regarding the manufacturer-supplier
structure in the Japanese automobile industry in general.  With respect to the degree of
sourcing concentration, the data are compatible with findings in existing studies.  For
example, the average number of suppliers from which each manufacturer procures for
various types of components range between two and three, and there are, at most, only five
or six suppliers.  It is also interesting to see no influence of the production volume on the
number of suppliers.  The two largest firms, Toyota and Nissan, do not necessarily deal
with more suppliers than other smaller firms.
One of the most interesting data in Table 2, though, is that one-customer ratios for
firms in the first group, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki, are all less than 10%.  With
respect to more than 90% of the components, these firms share at least one supplier with
competitors.  This data indicate that the supplier relationship in Japan may be characterized,
in general, as “quasi-market” transactions, rather than “quasi-hierarchical” transactions.
However, at the same time, this study shows that there are considerable differences among
Japanese manufacturers regarding this dimension.
c) Implications
 (1) Quasi-Hierarchy/Quasi-Market andInter-FirmRelationship
Many studies on the Japanese supplier relationship have mostly focused on the
nature of the inter-firm relationship (Asanuma, 1989; Helper, 1989 and 1991; Nishiguchi,
1994). This study, on the other hand, has proposed a sourcing structure dimension that
considers the manufacturer-supplier relationship as part of the entire network of
relationships.  This study has provided evidence that supports the existence of a sourcing
strategy dimension that ranges from quasi-hierarchy to quasi-market characteristics.  The
distinction between the two groups of firms, Group 1: the quasi-market strategy (Toyota,
Mitsubishi, and Suzuki) and Group 2: quasi-hierarchy strategy (Nissan and Honda), is
actually the difference between firms that benefit from market characteristics and those that
do not.  Firms that follow the quasi-market strategy may be able to enjoy both the
competitive mechanism of the market by reducing one-supplier concentration and the
benefits of network externalities by sharing common suppliers with competitors.
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Inter-Firm Relationship
Sourcing Structure
It is important to distinguish this dimension from the inter-firm relationship
dimension.  The framework in Figure 2 distinguishes the sourcing structure dimension
from the inter-firm relationship to determine the manufacturer-supplier relationship from
both perspectives of these dimensions.  The inter-firm relationship dimension ranges from
“cooperative” to “arms-length”, while the sourcing structure dimension ranges from quasi-
hierarchy to quasi-market.  These factors do not necessarily determined by the sourcing
structure such as degrees of supplier concentration and supplier sharing. Even when
manufacturers and suppliers form a quasi-hierarchical relationship, inter-firm relationship
could be either cooperative or arms-length depending on the nature of management.
With respect to the inter-firm relationship, based on the empirical results of other
studies, this study assumes that most Japanese transactions are through cooperative
relationships, compared to those in the U.S. at least in the 1980’s (Helper, 1991; Helper
and Sako, 1994).  With respect to sourcing concentration, existing studies have already
argued that Japanese automobile firms concentrate on a few suppliers to maintain a
cooperative relationship with them, and yet try to avoid concentrating on a single supplier.
Among the six manufacturers in the sample, three are firms that are more successful in
dispersing reliance into multiple suppliers than the others.  These three firms have also
achieved a higher profitability than the others.  This finding implies that as long as there is a
cooperative relationship and careful monitoring, manufacturers should enhance competitive
mechanism among a limited number of suppliers using the quasi-market strategy.
A unique contribution of this study is that our data have also supported the theory
that there may be another type of benefit of the quasi-market mechanism, which is related to
sharing suppliers with other firms, again as long as cooperative relationship is maintained.
The data have shown a positive relationship between the common supplier sharing and
assembler’s performance.  Firms could enjoy various types of benefits related to the
positive network externalities by sharing common suppliers.
(2) Benefits of Sharing Common Suppliers
This section further discusses the benefits and potential hazards behind the benefits.
First, manufacturers, by buying the same type of component from common suppliers, can
benefit from the scale economies in the supplier. In our interviews, an engineering manager
at Suzuki, which is the smallest firm with respect to production and still has a reputation as
a low cost manufacturer, seems to be most enthusiastic in sharing similar components with
its competitors.  He says that Suzuki often tries to find a component that has already been
used by other manufacturers.  Suzuki, for example, shares almost the same automatic
transmission components with Mitsubishi, Daihatsu, and Fuji for most of its mini-cars by
sharing the same supplier, Aishin Seiki, with these firms.  Honda, on the other hand, does
not share the same automatic transmission design with them for its mini-cars and cannot
benefit from similar scale economies that the other firms are enjoying.
Second, each manufacturer can buy a quality component from a multi-user supplier.
Even when a supplier sells a similar component with minor variations to multiple users, it
should test different applications individually in the context of different vehicle models.  A
manager at Daido Metal, which sells the engine metal to all six manufacturers in the sample,
mentioned that they have accumulated much more testing data than its competitors that sell
the same type of component to fewer users.  The accumulation of the data also contributes
to high-quality components in the following periods.  Related to this perspective, an
engineer at Toyota also pointed out that when Toyota knows that a certain component has
already been used by other car manufacturers, Toyota could sometimes simplify internal
testing processes.
Third, effective usage of common suppliers may enhance inter-manufacturer
learning.  For example, an engineer at Toyota mentioned that Toyota used to buy clutch
unit mostly only from Aishin Seiki, a Toyota keiretsu supplier, but it was considering to
add a foreign supplier.  One of the reasons for this strategic change was that Toyota wanted
more information about technologies that its competitors and their suppliers were
developing.  The engineer said that it is risky, with respect to effective information
collection, to exclusively rely on a Toyota keiretsu supplier that deals with only one or a
few limited customers.
In spite of these advantages, there are disadvantages in the supplier sharing
strategy.  Sharing common suppliers leads to information spillover that some
manufacturers may want to avoid.  There are two factors related to influences of the
information spillover.  First, when changes in technology are rapid, spillover would be a
big problem for a technically leading firm.  Second, spillover is beneficial to technological
followers, while it has a negative impact on leaders. When a firm wants to avoid any
spillover, it may think about internalization.  Therefore, spillover problems may be more
related to the make-or-buy decision, which this study does not focus on.
We, however,  realize that the strong positive influence of sharing common
suppliers this study found may also be attributed to the timing of data collection especially
with respect to the performance measurement.  Since the booming economies ended in the
early 1990’s in Japan, competition among the automobile firms have been based on product
price as opposed to technical features (Fujimoto and Takeishi, 1994).  If competition were
based more on technical innovations with respect to the sample components, there would
be stronger negative impacts from the technical spillover that is associated with the supplier
sharing strategy.  In that case, the benefits of sharing suppliers in some firms could be
traded off by the technical spillover to competitors.
Finally, we would like to briefly discuss the strategy at Honda.  The  data regarding
Honda do not perfectly fit with our conclusions.  Honda, like Nissan, has followed the
quasi-hierarchy strategy and yet does not perform as poorly as Nissan. Honda is the
manufacturer that has been focusing on its unique technologies in its competitive strategy.
A purchasing director at Honda acknowledged in an interview that Honda tends to stick to
its proprietary technologies and avoid sharing common suppliers with its competitors
(JAPIA, 1995, pp. 68).  Honda’s differentiation strategy and its engineering capabilities to
implement it may have fitted with the quasi-hierarchical approach, in which Honda avoids
technology spillover to its competitors.  However, Honda’s uniqueness in technologies
seems to have been fading and the competition in the industry also seems to have become
based less on unique technologies.  The director at Honda actually adds a comment in the
same interview that under the “borderless” age in terms of keiretsu system, Honda also
needs to change its strategy to procure more components from other suppliers in order to be
competitive in cost.  Therefore, we believe that at least in the Japanese automobile industry,
benefits from the network externalities may surpass those from procuring from proprietary
suppliers for most components.
d) Future Research
This study has proposed many potential research areas that need to be studied
further.  First, we would like to analyze data at the component level, which would provide
us with sufficient data points, even though it is difficult to collect performance data at this
level.  In addition, further study needs to be done in other industries to modify and
generalize our findings.  As discussed earlier, in industries where technological changes are
fast, the quasi-hierarchy strategy at a technically leading firm may perform better because
the strategy is appropriate to limit information spillover.  Alternatively, however, benefits
of the network externalities such as enhanced standardization and inter-firm learning could
still surpass the benefits regarding the limited spillover.  The personal computer industry
seems to be supporting the latter case.
Secondly, in order to analyze the benefits with respect to common supplier sharing,
further studies need to be done to analyze more details regarding its positive mechanisms.
Specifically, three competitors, Toyota, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki, have formed a network
containing common suppliers and seem to benefit from the network.  It is important to
analyze firms and relationships as part of the network of relationships, rather than
relationships only at the dyadic level (Granovetter, 1985; Takeishi and Cusumano, 1995).
It is also important to see the mechanism by which Nissan and Honda have been positioned
outside the network.  Historical studies may be needed to answer this question.
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